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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2578 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  TORMU E. PRALL, 
Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 3-10-cv-01228) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
September 1, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 21, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Tormu E. Prall seeks a writ of mandamus directing the disqualification of a 
District Judge and Magistrate Judge.  Delays in the District Court are some cause for 
concern as discussed below, but we will deny the petition. 
I. 
Prall is a New Jersey prisoner with “three strikes” under the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, which means that he cannot proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) unless he “is 
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under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  In March 2010, 
he filed a motion for leave to proceed IFP in the District Court along with a complaint, 
which he later amended.  Prall alleges that corrections officers torture him “at least once a 
week” in various specific ways.  He also sought emergency injunctive relief to stop the 
alleged abuse.   
In August 2010, the District Court deemed Prall’s allegations of imminent danger 
insufficient and denied him leave to proceed IFP.  Prall appealed.  In April 2011, we held 
that Prall had adequately alleged an imminent danger of serious physical injury.  See 
Prall v. Bocchini, 421 F. App’x 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2011).  We expressed no opinion on the 
merits of those allegations, and we noted that Prall’s complaint remains subject to 
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  See id. at 145-46.  We remanded for the 
District Court to grant Prall’s IFP motion if he showed indigence.  See id. at 145.  Our 
mandate issued on April 28, 2011. 
The day before, Prall had filed in the District Court a motion to disqualify the 
District Judge and Magistrate Judge to whom his case was assigned.  Prall also renewed 
his request for injunctive relief.  On July 8, 2011, Prall notified the District Court that he 
intended to seek mandamus in this Court if it did not rule on his requests.  Prall later filed 
the instant mandamus petition.  The District Court has since denied Prall’s 
disqualification motion. 
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II. 
Neither Prall’s disqualification motion nor his mandamus petition specifies the 
statute under which he seeks disqualification.  We may review by mandamus District 
Judges’ decisions not to disqualify themselves under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  See In re Sch. 
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 775 (3d Cir. 1992).  That statute requires disqualification 
from “any proceeding in which [the judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  Our review is for abuse of discretion.  See In re 
Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 300-01 (3d Cir. 2004).  We perceive no abuse of 
discretion here.1
In the District Court, Prall moved for disqualification primarily on the basis of 
arguments that he previously raised in filings in other cases and a disciplinary complaint, 
all of which he merely referenced without specifying what the arguments were.  The 
District Judge nevertheless identified those arguments and concluded that they do not 
warrant disqualification under § 455(a), in large part because they are conclusory and do 
not state any basis to question her impartiality.  For the reasons adequately explained by 
the District Judge, we agree. 
 
                                                 
1 The District Court also addressed Prall’s disqualification motion under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 144, which requires disqualification when a judge “has a personal bias or prejudice” 
against or in favor of a party.  Orders denying disqualification under § 144 generally are 
reviewable only on appeal from a final judgment, see In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 
at 775, but we note that Prall has asserted nothing in his mandamus petition suggesting 
actual bias under that statute. 
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In his mandamus petition, Prall limits his request for disqualification to two 
specific grounds.  First, he argues that the District Judge’s rulings against him in this and 
other cases reflect bias.  That argument lacks merit.  “[J]udicial rulings alone almost 
never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 
U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  Prall has alleged nothing about the prior rulings that might except 
them from this general principle.  Cf. Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 97-98 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (holding that District Court displayed appearance of partiality by stating in 
discovery ruling that defendant’s industry “‘may be the king of concealment and 
disinformation’”) (citation omitted).  And, although we vacated the District Court’s 
denial of IFP status in this case, we perceive no suggestion of bias in that ruling.  The 
District Court later stated that it had merely “mistakenly overlooked” Prall’s relevant 
allegations (Docket No. 28 at 11), and Prall has asserted nothing calling that statement 
into question. 
Second, Prall argues that disqualification is warranted by the District Court’s 
delays in serving his IFP complaint and addressing his request for injunctive relief.2
                                                 
2 Prall does not request a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to take 
those steps, but instead asserts its delays in doing so solely as grounds for 
disqualification. 
  
These delays are indeed cause for concern.  We ruled on April 6, 2011, that Prall’s 
allegations of ongoing beatings by corrections officers adequately alleged an imminent 
danger of serious physical injury and we remanded for further proceedings.  To date, 
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however, the District Court has neither ruled on Prall’s motion for injunctive relief nor 
taken any steps to implement this Court’s mandate.  This delay does not rise to the level 
of a due process violation, see Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), but 
Prall’s allegations of ongoing physical abuse would appear to warrant more expeditious 
treatment. 
Nevertheless, Prall has alleged nothing suggesting that this delay gives rise to the 
appearance of bias or partiality.  Matters of docket control generally are within the 
District Court’s sound discretion.  See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 
(3d Cir. 1982).  We also recognize that Prall continues to be a difficult litigant whose 
numerous and often frivolous filings have made significant and often unwarranted 
demands on the District Court.  If Prall truly desires an expeditious ruling on the merits 
of his claims, he would be well served not to continue to burden the judiciary’s limited 
resources with unnecessary motions practice. 
This is not to suggest that the District Court should treat lightly Prall’s current 
allegations of ongoing abuse, and the District Court has given no indication that it will.  
To the contrary, the District Court twice notes in its recent opinion that it intends to rule 
separately on his request for injunctive relief.  (Docket No. 28 at 1 n.1 & 5 n.3.)  We see 
no reason not to take the court at its word, and we trust that it will address Prall’s motion 
and otherwise comply with our mandate in due course. 
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For these reasons, we will deny Prall’s mandamus petition.  His motion for 
expedited consideration is granted, and his motion “for leave” regarding his prison 
account statement is denied as moot. 
